When Economics met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law
Patrice Bougette (),
Marc Deschamps and
Frédéric Marty
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Patrice Bougette: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur
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Abstract:
We interrogate the legal and economic history to analyse the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the United States. They show that the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped the inception of antitrust law. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of U.S. competition law, they highlight U.S. economists' caution toward antitrust until the Second New Deal and analyse the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. They rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm became collective—that is, the "economization" process in U.S. antitrust. Finally, the authors discuss the implications and possible pitfalls of such a conversion to economics-led antitrust enforcement.
Keywords: Antitrust; Economization; Chocago School (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05-23
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Published in Enterprise and Society, 2015, 2015_2, 16 (2), pp.313-353
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Related works:
Journal Article: When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law (2015)
Working Paper: When economics met antitrust: The second Chicago School and the economization of antitrust law (2015)
Working Paper: When economics met antitrust: The second Chicago School and the economization of antitrust law (2015)
Working Paper: When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law (2014)
Working Paper: When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01154814
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