When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law

Patrice Bougette (), Marc Deschamps and Frédéric Marty
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Patrice Bougette: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur

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Abstract: In this article,we use a history of economic thought perspective to analyze the process by which the Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and became dominant in the US. We show the extent to which economic objectives and theoretical views shaped antitrust laws in their inception. After establishing the minor influence of economics in the promulgation of US competition laws, we then highlight US economists' very cautious views about antitrust until the Second New Deal. We analyze the process by which the Chicago School developed a general and coherent framework for competition policy. We rely mainly on the seminal and programmatic work of Director and Levi (1956) and trace how this theoretical paradigm was made collective, i.e. the "economization" process took place in US antitrust. Finally, we discuss the implications, if not the possible pitfalls, of such a conversion to economics - led competition law enforcement.

Keywords: Chicago School; Consumer Welfare; Monopolization; Efficiency; Antitrust; politique de concurrence; bien-être du consommateur; Ecole de Chicago; efficience; abus de position dominante (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-his and nep-hpe
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Related works:
Journal Article: When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law (2015)
Working Paper: When economics met antitrust: The second Chicago School and the economization of antitrust law (2015)
Working Paper: When Economics met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law (2015)
Working Paper: When economics met antitrust: The second Chicago School and the economization of antitrust law (2015)
Working Paper: When Economics Met Antitrust: The Second Chicago School and the Economization of Antitrust Law (2014)
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