Rewarding judicial independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court
Nicolas Gavoille () and
Fabio Padovano ()
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Nadia Fiorino: Dipartimento di Ingegneria Industriale e dell'Informazione e di Economia - UNIVAQ.IT - Università degli Studi dell'Aquila [L'Aquila]
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Keywords: post-Court political appointments; revisionist view; judicial independence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, 2015, 43, pp.56-66. ⟨10.1016/j.irle.2015.05.002⟩
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Journal Article: Rewarding judicial independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court (2015)
Working Paper: Rewarding Judicial Independance: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional court (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01183207
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