Rewarding Judicial Independance: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional court
Nicolas Gavoille () and
Fabio Padovano ()
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Nadia Fiorino: Dipartimento di Sistemi e Istituzioni per l’Economia, Università degli Studi dell’Aquila, Italy
Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS from Condorcet Center for political Economy
We use data about the Italian Constitutional Court (1956-2005) to verify an implication of the “revisionist” explanations of judicial independence with respect to judicial appointments, namely that elected politicians reward more independent justices with appointments after the Court tenure. The empirical strategy is two-step. First, we estimate a logit fixed-effect model to evaluate the personal degree of independence for each Italian justice reporter. This “judge-effect” is based on the proneness of a judge to declare the constitutional illegitimacy of a law controlling for the environmental conditional phenomena. Second, we verify to what extent this degree of independence affects the probability of obtaining a politically controlled occupation after the end of the mandate at the Court. Our results, obtained by a variety of estimators to check their robustness, strongly support the revisionist view.
Keywords: Judicial independence; revisionist view; post Court political appointments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Rewarding judicial independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court (2015)
Working Paper: Rewarding judicial independence: Evidence from the Italian Constitutional Court (2015)
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