Inter-firm Social Responsibility and the Coordination and Regulation of Multinational Network Firms: An Economic Analysis

Bernard Baudry () and Virgile Chassagnon
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Bernard Baudry: TRIANGLE - Triangle : action, discours, pensée politique et économique - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - IEP Lyon - Sciences Po Lyon - Institut d'études politiques de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper analyzes corporate social responsibility (CSR) through the lens of inter-firm relationships. "Inter-firm social responsibility" (IFSR) is based on institutional coordination mechanisms such as labels, codes, agreements, and certificates. We investigate the normative scope of this principle of regulation through two mechanisms – codes of conduct and ISO standards – from an economic perspective in terms of their logic and efficiency. We show that although these two mechanisms are aimed at facilitating inter-firm coordination and minimizing the negative social and environmental externalities produced by suppliers, they need to be clearly differentiated. We focus on the normative impact of these institutional mechanisms on the governance and regulation of multinational network firms.

Keywords: Inter-firm social responsibilities (IFSR); network-firm; conduct codes; ISO norms; coordination and regulation of inter-firm relationships (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-03-01
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Published in Revue d'économie industrielle , 2012, 137

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01372384

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