Formal education versus learning-by-doing: On the labor market efficiency of educational choices

Frédéric Gavrel, Isabelle Lebon and Therese Rebiere

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Educational choices are studied in a two-sectors search-and-matching model where qualifications are required for access to good jobs. Qualifications can be acquired either before entering the labor market through formal education , or through learning-by-doing in a low-skill job. Spontaneously, the economy creates too many high-skill jobs and accordingly individuals devote too much effort to formal education. However, educational effort alone becomes insufficient when the rate of creation of these high-skill jobs is reduced to its optimal level. In conclusion , we show that an efficient policy would be to subsidize both education and low-skill firms whose workers quit when obtaining a job in the high-skill sector, both elements financed by a tax on high-skill firms.

Keywords: on-the-job search; Formal education; learning by doing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Economic Modelling, 2016, 54, pp.545 - 562. ⟨10.1016/j.econmod.2016.01.006⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Formal education versus learning-by-doing: On the labor market efficiency of educational choices (2016)
Working Paper: Formal education versus learning-by-doing: On the labor market efficiency of educational choices (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01377598

DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2016.01.006

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD (hal@ccsd.cnrs.fr).