 COMPETITION POLICY AS A LEVER FOR INDUSTRIAL POLICY: SOME REFLECTIONS ON HORIZONTAL CARTELS PROSECUTION IN THE POST-WAR FRANCELa politique de concurrence comme levier de la politique industrielle dans la France de l’après-guerreFrédéric Marty and Claude Didry Post-Print from HAL Abstract: The establishment of the cartels technical commission in 1953, seems to prefigure the German competition law and the Treaty of Rome four years later. However some differences have to be put into relief. First, it does not participate to a defence of competition law based order as the German ordo-liberals promoted at that time. Second, the collusive practices targeted mainly concerned bid-rigging practices in public procurement in the reconstruction and modernisation plans. If this competition policy contrasts with war experiences and the interwar period arguments for a regulated competition, sanctioning horizontal collusion makes sense within an industrial policy model based on a close co-operation between Government and some national champions Keywords: CARTELS – CHAMPION NATIONAL – NÉO-LIBÉRALISME – PLAN DE RECONSTRUCTION – POLITIQUE INDUSTRIELLE – POLITIQUES DE CONCURRENCE – SERVICES PUBLICS; CARTEL AGREEMENTS – COMPETITION POLICY; INDUSTRIAL POLICY – NATIONAL CHAMPION – NEO-LIBERALISM; RECONSTRUCTION PLAN – UTILITIES (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Gouvernement & action publique, 2017, 5 (4), pp.23-45 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01442775 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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