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Whistleblowing vs random audit: An experimental test of relative efficiency

Cécile Bazart, Mickael Beaud and Dimitri Dubois ()
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Cécile Bazart: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement

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Abstract: This paper reports an experimental test of the relative efficiency of a whistleblowing-based audit scheme compared to a random-based audit scheme. We design a between-subjects laboratory experiment with two treatments: a benchmark with a random-based audit scheme and an alternative treatment in which taxpayers can blow the whistle. Compared to the benchmark, the whistleblowing-based audit scheme (i) improves the targeting of evaders, (ii) decreases the monetary amount of tax evasion, and (iii) raises the tax levy.

Keywords: Tax evasion; tax compliance; deterrence; detection; audit policy; denouncement; laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Kyklos, 2020, 73, pp.47-67. ⟨10.1111/kykl.12215⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Whistleblowing vs. Random Audit: An Experimental Test of Relative Efficiency (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Whistleblowing vs random audit: An experimental test of relative effciency (2017) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02311618

DOI: 10.1111/kykl.12215

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