Economics at your fingertips  

Whistleblowing vs random audit: An experimental test of relative effciency

Cécile Bazart (), Mickael Beaud () and Dimitri Dubois ()

Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier

Abstract: This paper reports an experimental test of the relative effciency of a whistleblowing-based audit scheme compared to a random-based audit scheme. We design a between-subjects laboratory experiment with two treatments: a benchmark with a random-based audit scheme and an alternative treatment in which taxpayers can blow the whistle. Compared to the benchmark, the whistleblowing-based audit scheme (i) decreases the monetary amount of tax evasion, (ii) improves the targeting of evaders and (iii) raises the tax levy

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-exp and nep-iue
Date: 2017-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) First version, 05-2017 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Patricia Modat ().

Page updated 2019-10-18
Handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:17-04