Whistleblowing vs random audit: An experimental test of relative effciency

Cécile Bazart, Mickael Beaud and Dimitri Dubois ()

Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier

Abstract: This paper reports an experimental test of the relative effciency of a whistleblowing-based audit scheme compared to a random-based audit scheme. We design a between-subjects laboratory experiment with two treatments: a benchmark with a random-based audit scheme and an alternative treatment in which taxpayers can blow the whistle. Compared to the benchmark, the whistleblowing-based audit scheme (i) decreases the monetary amount of tax evasion, (ii) improves the targeting of evaders and (iii) raises the tax levy

Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2017-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-exp and nep-iue
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/DR2017-04.pdf First version, 05-2017 (application/pdf)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Whistleblowing vs. Random Audit: An Experimental Test of Relative Efficiency (2020)
Working Paper: Whistleblowing vs random audit: An experimental test of relative efficiency (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lam:wpaper:17-04

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