Whistleblowing vs random audit: An experimental test of relative effciency
Cécile Bazart (),
Mickael Beaud () and
Dimitri Dubois ()
Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier
This paper reports an experimental test of the relative effciency of a whistleblowing-based audit scheme compared to a random-based audit scheme. We design a between-subjects laboratory experiment with two treatments: a benchmark with a random-based audit scheme and an alternative treatment in which taxpayers can blow the whistle. Compared to the benchmark, the whistleblowing-based audit scheme (i) decreases the monetary amount of tax evasion, (ii) improves the targeting of evaders and (iii) raises the tax levy
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http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/DR2017-04.pdf First version, 05-2017 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lam:wpaper:17-04
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