Competitive Bargaining Equilibria

Julio Dávila and Jan Eeckhout

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Abstract: We propose a simple bargaining procedure, the equilibrium of which converges to the Walrasian allocation as the agents become increasingly patient. We thus establish that the competitive outcome obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other bargaining protocols the final outcome depends on bargaining power or relative impatience, the outcome here is determinate and depends only on preferences and endowments. This procedure has therefore important implications for policy applications compared to standard bargaining rules.

Keywords: quantity constraints; Price-setting; Walrasian equilibrium; Alternating-offers bargaining; négociation à des offres alternantes; équilibre concurrentiel; fixation de prix; contraintes sur les quantités (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-04
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03330448
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Published in 2004

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Related works:
Working Paper: Competitive bargaining equilibrium (2009)
Journal Article: Competitive bargaining equilibrium (2008)
Working Paper: Competitive Bargaining Equilibrium (2008)
Working Paper: Competitive Bargaining Equilibrium (2008)
Working Paper: Competitive Bargaining Equilibrium (2008)
Working Paper: Competitive Bargaining Equilibria (2004)
Working Paper: Competitive Bargaining Equilibria (2004)
Working Paper: Competitive Bargaining Equilibrium (2004)
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