Competitive Bargaining Equilibrium

Julio Dávila () and Jan Eeckhout
Additional contact information
Julio Dávila: Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Julio Dávila

PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract: We propose a simple bargaining procedure, the equilibrium of which converges to the Walrasian allocation as the agents become increasingly patient. We thus establish that the competitive outcome obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other bargaining protocols the final outcome depends on bargaining power or relative impatience, the outcome here is determinate and depends only on preferences and endowments. This procedure has therefore important implications for policy applications compared to standard bargaining rules.

Keywords: Bargaining; Walrasian Equilibrium; Price-setting; Quantity Constraints; Search; Matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C71 D41 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2004-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/file ... ng-papers/04-024.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Competitive bargaining equilibrium (2009)
Journal Article: Competitive bargaining equilibrium (2008)
Working Paper: Competitive Bargaining Equilibrium (2008)
Working Paper: Competitive Bargaining Equilibrium (2008)
Working Paper: Competitive Bargaining Equilibrium (2008)
Working Paper: Competitive Bargaining Equilibria (2004)
Working Paper: Competitive Bargaining Equilibria (2004)
Working Paper: Competitive Bargaining Equilibria (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pen:papers:04-024

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PIER Working Paper Archive from Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 133 South 36th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Administrator ().