Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games

Sylvain Béal, Jacques Durieu () and Philippe Solal
Additional contact information
Jacques Durieu: CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne

Post-Print from HAL

Date: 2007-01-18
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in 12th CTN Workshop Network and Coalition Formation among Heterogeneous Agents: Theory, Applications and Experiments, Jan 2007, Louvain la neuve, Belgium

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games (2008)
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games (2008)
Working Paper: Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games (2008)
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games (2007)
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games (2007)
Working Paper: Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games (2007)
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:ujm-00162456

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().