Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games

Sylvain Béal, Jacques Durieu () and Philippe Solal
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Jacques Durieu: CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne

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Date: 2007-07-04
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Published in Third Spain Italy Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory (SING III), Jul 2007, Madrid, Spain

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Journal Article: Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games (2008)
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games (2008)
Working Paper: Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games (2008)
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games (2007)
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games (2007)
Working Paper: Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games (2007)
Working Paper: Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-games (2007)
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