The Simple Analytics of Elite Behaviour Under Limited State Capacity

François Bourguignon and Thierry Verdier

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: This chapter discusses the issue of taxation and redistribution in economies dominated by elites with limited state capacity. Within a simple aggregate framework, we discuss the political economy incentives of elites to tax, redistribute, and increase state capacity. In particular, the analysis highlights the role of complementarities or substitutability in the production process between the factors controlled by the elite and other social groups, and shows the existence of natural increasing returns for elites to increase state capacity. The chapter also discusses how the incentives for state capacity building are affected by political threats of power shifting

Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Alice H. Amsden, Alisa DiCaprio, Alice DiCaprio, James A. Robinson. The Role of Elites in Economic Development, Oxford University Press, pp.251-, 2012, 9780199659036. ⟨10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659036.001.0001⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Simple Analytics of Elite Behaviour Under Limited State Capacity (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-00813062

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199659036.001.0001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Caroline Bauer ().