The Simple Analytics of Elite Behaviour Under Limited State Capacity

François Bourguignon and Thierry Verdier

No wp-2010-104, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: This paper discusses the issue of taxation and redistribution in economies dominated by Elites with limited state capacity. Within a simple aggregate framework, we discuss the political economy incentives of Elites to tax, redistribute and increase state capacity. In particular, the analysis highlights the role of complementarities or substitutability in the production process between the factors controlled by the Elite and other social groups and shows the existence of natural increasing returns for Elites to increase state capacity.

Keywords: Income distribution; Political science; Wealth (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Simple Analytics of Elite Behaviour Under Limited State Capacity (2012)
Working Paper: The Simple Analytics of Elite Behaviour Under Limited State Capacity (2012)
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