 A Broomean model of rationality and reasoningFranz Dietrich,
Antonios Staras () and
Robert Sugden
PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL Abstract: John Broome has developed an account of rationality and reasoning which gives philosophical foundations for choice theory and the psychology of rational agents. We formalize his account into a model that di¤ers from ordinary choice-theoretic models through focusing on psychology and the reasoning process. Within that model, we ask Broome s central question of whether reasoning can make us more rational: whether it allows us to acquire transitive preferences, consistent beliefs, non-akratic intentions, and so on. We identify three structural types of rationality requirements: consistency requirements, completeness requirements, and closedness requirements. Many standard rationality requirements fall under this typology. Based on three theorems, we argue that reasoning is successful in achieving closedness requirements, but not in achieving consistency or completeness requirements. We assess how far our negative results reveal gaps in Broome s theory, or de ciencies in choice theory and behavioural economics. Date: 2019-11 Published in Journal of Philosophy, 2019, 116 (11), pp.585-614. ⟨10.5840/jphil20191161138⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:hal-03967694 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL |
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