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Public and Private Investments in Regulated Network Industries: Coordination and Competition Issues

Bruno Jullien, Jerome Pouyet and Wilfried Sand-Zantman

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: This paper analyzes the relationship between a national regulator, an incumbent and a local government in a context where investment in a new network has to be undertaken. In the light of the recent debates on the competition between private firms and local governments, we analyze the limits to be put on the local public intervention in these markets. We show that banning local government intervention can be welfare-enhancing either in the presence inter-districts externality or with asymmetric information or in case of conflicting objectives between the regulator and local governments.

Keywords: Investment; Regulation; Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://pjse.hal.science/halshs-00754428v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Review of Network Economics, 2010, 9 (4), pp.Article 3. ⟨10.2202/1446-9022.1232⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Public and Private Investments in Regulated Network Industries: Coordination and Competition Issues (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Public and Private Investments in Regulated Network Industries: Coordination and Competition Issues (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Public and Private Investments in Regulated Network Industries: Coordination and Competition Issues (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Public and Private Investments in Regulated Network Industries: Coordination and Competition Issues (2009) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754428

DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1232

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