Efficient tax competition under the origin principle

Stephane Gauthier

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: This paper studies fiscal competition under the origin principle. It identifies a pattern of consumers' taste heterogeneity under which the first‐best world social optimum arises as a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Consumers' tastes are characterized by the strength of their preference for home and foreign goods. Nash implementation of the first‐best obtains when in every tax jurisdiction the number of consumers who display a home bias (those consumers who prefer purchasing the home good to shopping abroad at equal prices) equals, for every magnitude of the home bias, the number of consumers who display an "import bias" (those who instead prefer shopping abroad) equal in magnitude.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2018, 20 (1), pp.85 - 99. ⟨10.1111/jpet.12262⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Efficient tax competition under the origin principle (2018)
Working Paper: Efficient tax competition under the origin principle (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01802881

DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12262

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Caroline Bauer ().