Efficient tax competition under the origin principle

Stephane Gauthier

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2018, vol. 20, issue 1, 85-99

Abstract: This paper studies fiscal competition under the origin principle. It identifies a pattern of consumers' taste heterogeneity under which the first‐best world social optimum arises as a noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Consumers' tastes are characterized by the strength of their preference for home and foreign goods. Nash implementation of the first‐best obtains when in every tax jurisdiction the number of consumers who display a home bias (those consumers who prefer purchasing the home good to shopping abroad at equal prices) equals, for every magnitude of the home bias, the number of consumers who display an “import bias” (those who instead prefer shopping abroad) equal in magnitude.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12262

Related works:
Working Paper: Efficient tax competition under the origin principle (2018)
Working Paper: Efficient tax competition under the origin principle (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:20:y:2018:i:1:p:85-99

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().