Friend-Based Ranking in Practice

Francis Bloch and Matthew Olckers

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: A planner aims to target individuals who exceed a threshold in a characteristic, such as wealth or ability. The individuals can rank their friends according to the characteristic. We study a strategy-proof mechanism for the planner to use the rankings for targeting. We discuss how the mechanism works in practice when the rankings may contain errors.

Date: 2021-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 2021, 111, pp.567-571. ⟨10.1257/pandp.20211060⟩

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Journal Article: Friend-Based Ranking in Practice (2021)
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Working Paper: Friend-Based Ranking in Practice (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03230056

DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20211060

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