Friend-Based Ranking in Practice

Francis Bloch and Matthew Olckers

AEA Papers and Proceedings, 2021, vol. 111, 567-71

Abstract: A planner aims to target individuals who exceed a threshold in a characteristic, such as wealth or ability. The individuals can rank their friends according to the characteristic. We study a strategy-proof mechanism for the planner to use the rankings for targeting. We discuss how the mechanism works in practice when the rankings may contain errors.

JEL-codes: D82 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Friend-Based Ranking in Practice (2021)
Working Paper: Friend-Based Ranking in Practice (2021)
Working Paper: Friend-Based Ranking in Practice (2021)
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DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20211060

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