Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation

Ingela Alger and Jean-François Laslier

PSE Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: This paper revisits two classical problems in the theory of voting-viz. the divided majority problem and the strategic revelation of information by majority vote-in the light of evolutionarily founded partial Kantian morality. It is shown that, compared to electorates consisting of purely self-interested voters, such Kantian morality helps voters solve coordination problems and improves the information aggregation properties of equilibria, even for modest levels of morality.

Keywords: Condorcet jury theorem; Divided majority problem; Voting; Homo moralis; Kantian morality; Social dilemmas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hme and nep-mic
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03031118v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: Coordination and information aggregation (2022)
Working Paper: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation (2022)
Working Paper: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation (2022)
Working Paper: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation (2021)
Working Paper: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation (2021)
Working Paper: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation (2020)
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