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Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation

Ingela Alger and Jean-François Laslier

No 20-118, IAST Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST)

Abstract: This paper revisits two classical problems in the theory of voting—viz. the divided majority problem and the strategic revelation of information—in the light of evolutionarily founded partial Kantian morality. It is shown that, compared to electorates consisting of purely self-interested voters, such Kantian morality helps voters solve coordination problems and improves the information aggregation properties of equilibria, even for modest levels of morality.

Keywords: voting; Homo moralis; Kantian morality; social dilemmas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-11, Revised 2021-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: Coordination and information aggregation (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: coordination and information aggregation (2020) Downloads
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