Information Design by an Informed Designer

Frederic Koessler and Vasiliki Skreta
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Vasiliki Skreta: CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR, University of Texas at Austin [Austin], UCL - University College of London [London]

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Abstract: A designer is privately informed about the state and chooses an information disclosure mechanism to influence the decisions of multiple agents playing a game. We define an intuitive class of incentive compatible information disclosure mechanisms which we coin interim optimal mechanisms. We prove that an interim optimal mechanism exists, and that it is an equilibrium outcome of the interim information design game. An ex-ante optimal mechanism may not be interim optimal, but it is whenever it is ex-post optimal. In addition, in leading settings in which action sets are binary, every ex-ante optimal mechanism is interim optimal. We relate interim optimal mechanisms to other solutions of informed principal problems.

Keywords: Core mechanism; Bayesian persuasion; Interim information design; Neutral optimum; Informed principal; Strong-neologism proofness; Verifiable types (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Related works:
Working Paper: Information Design by an Informed Designer (2021)
Working Paper: Information Design by an Informed Designer (2021)
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