Informed Information Design

Frederic Koessler and Vasiliki Skreta

Journal of Political Economy, 2023, vol. 131, issue 11, 3186 - 3232

Abstract: We study informed persuasion, whereby a privately informed designer without ex ante commitment power chooses disclosure mechanisms to influence agents’ actions. We characterize the subset of Bayes-correlated equilibria yielding every designer type a payoff higher than what they could get from any disclosure mechanism with credible beliefs. This set of interim-optimal mechanisms is nonempty and tractable, and all its elements are perfect Bayesian equilibrium mechanisms of the informed-designer game. Interim-optimal mechanisms are characterized via belief-based approaches in pure persuasion settings. We identify single- and multiagent interactive environments in which ex ante–optimal mechanisms are interim optimal.

Date: 2023
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Related works:
Working Paper: Informed Information Design (2022)
Working Paper: Informed Information Design (2022)
Working Paper: Informed Information Design (2022)
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