Delegation in Inconsistency: the 'Lisbon Strategy' Record an an Institutional Failure

Eloi Laurent, Jerome Creel and Jacques Le Cacheux

SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL

Abstract: In this paper, we develop an analysis of the reasons for the apparent failure of the "Lisbon strategy" (2000) so far. After having made the general case for a comprehensive "institutionalist perspective" on the European economy, we first try to formalise the objectives of "Lisbon" in order to present a mid-term review of the results attained. Since we find, like many others, that too little has been achieved, we then offer some possible explanations. Apart from an inconsistency problem between the different objectives set, we argue that the major reason for this failure appears to lie in the contradiction between the EU macroeconomic policy framework, based on the logic of delegation of power and control to independent authorities with conservative objectives, and the proactive policies required by the "Lisbon strategy", which objectives the EU member states eventually find themselves accountable for (not) achieving individually.

Date: 2005-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00972772
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00972772/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Delegation in inconsistency: the Lisbon strategy record as an institutional failure (2005)
Working Paper: Delegation in Inconsistency: the 'Lisbon Strategy' Record an an Institutional Failure (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-00972772

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Contact - Sciences Po Departement of Economics ().