Who Captures Whom? Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union

Cornelia Woll ()
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Cornelia Woll: CERI - Centre de recherches internationales (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Trade policy is a classic field for the study of private influence on policy-making. Firms and industries can gain clear advantages by protecting their markets from foreign competition or by gaining access to other countries. A large portion of the literature on international political economy therefore explains policy choices with reference to the demands of constituent interests (see Frieden and Martin 2002). For anybody interested in business lobbying, trade policy would seem to be the most appropriate place to start. And yet, comparing trade policy lobbying in the U.S. and the EU leaves many observers surprised. Aggressive business lobbying on trade issues is much less common in Brussels than it is in Washington, D.C. (e.g. Coen 1999; cf. Woll 2006). Shaffer (2003: 6) underlines that U.S. firms and trade associations are very proactive in business-government relations on trade policy. This "bottom-up" approach contrasts with the "top down" EU approach where public authority, in particular the European Commission, plays the predominant entrepreneurial role (...).

Date: 2009-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-00972851
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Published in Coen David, Richardson Jeremy. Lobbying in the European Union: Institutions, Actors and Issues, Oxford University Press, pp.268-288, 2009, 9780199207350

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