How Much Further Can the WTO Go? Developed Countries Issues
Patrick Messerlin ()
Additional contact information
Patrick Messerlin: GEM - Groupe d'économie mondiale - Sciences Po - Sciences Po
SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL
Abstract:
A lack of political leadership is often perceived as the main source of the repeated difficulties of the WTO. The paper argues that such a lack of leadership is a systemic problem for many years to come. The large industrial democracies have constitutional rules making particularly difficult trade liberalization in agriculture, and their governments rely on majorities which are increasingly thinner, hence less resistant to even tiny pressure groups. Then the paper argues that bilateral trade agreements ("bilaterals") do not offer a solution to such a lack of political leadership. Firstly, it shows that the often mentioned recent increase in bilaterals grossly overestimates the true evolution. Secondly, it stresses the fact that, so far, the push behind these bilaterals comes mostly from the small countries, not from the large ones. Lastly, it shows that the 2006 initiative of the European Commission - the first proactive move of a large country - would launch a race to bilaterals so costly that they are unlikely to be sustainable in the long run.
Keywords: Domestic politics and trade; Regional trade agreements; Doha Round; WTO (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00973103
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00973103/document (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-00973103
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Contact - Sciences Po Departement of Economics ().