Bargaining on Law and Bureaucracies: A Constitutional Theory of Development

Eric Brousseau, Yves Schemeil () and Jérôme Sgard ()
Additional contact information
Yves Schemeil: PACTE - Pacte, Laboratoire de sciences sociales - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - UJF - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble 1 - IEPG - Sciences Po Grenoble - Institut d'études politiques de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Jérôme Sgard: CERI - Centre de recherches internationales (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL

Abstract: The process of development is linked to the rise of an integrated and competitive economy and polity that allow a maximal division of labor and innovation. This process relies on two intertwined dynamics. First, in the establishment of the rule of law, legal instruments are appropriated by those who call for more autonomy, resulting in a progressive equalization of rights. Second, development of a capable and impartial state is a prerequisite to implementation of rights, including their translation into services delivered to citizens. The mutual expansion of these dynamics relies on a vertical negotiation between the elite and the governed. The governed call for rights that are more firmly established and more extended. The ruling elite can grant these rights to maintain its legitimacy and hence its recognized authority. This model allows discussing the sustainability of various paths of institutional change in processes of development by identifying the potential virtuous dynamics and hindering factors.

Keywords: delegation; rights; constitutional bargain; Institutions and development Rule of law Public bureaucracy State (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01052975v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Journal of Comparative Economics, 2010, 38 (3), pp.253-266. ⟨10.1016/j.jce.2010.07.004⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01052975v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining on law and bureaucracies: A constitutional theory of development (2010)
Working Paper: Bargaining on Law and Bureaucracies: A Constitutional Theory of Development (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-01052975

DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2010.07.004

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Contact - Sciences Po Departement of Economics ().