The Uruguay negotiations on subsidies and countervailing measures: past and future constraints

Patrick Messerlin ()
Additional contact information
Patrick Messerlin: GEM - Groupe d'économie mondiale - Sciences Po - Sciences Po

SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL

Abstract: The Uruguay Round Negotiating Groups on countervailing and antidumping procedures share many common issues. This is not accidental, claims this paper, but mirrors the way import-competing firms have become the driving force of antidumping and countervailing procedures set up under the Tokyo Round. Countervailing actions are likely to be a poor instrument for limiting subsidies for economic reasons inherent in the profit maximizing behaviour of the complaining firms. However, to strengthen disciplines on countervailing measures would be meaningless without narrowing the currently pervasive definition of dumping and strengthening disciplines in antidumping procedures. This is related to the fact that US and EC firms have increasingly used antidumping procedures as a substitute for countervailing actions. The paper underlines the importance of disciplines in antidumping procedures by noting the links between antidumping, safeguard procedures, and the Multifibre Arrangement.

Date: 1989-04-30
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01064780
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01064780/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-01064780

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Contact - Sciences Po Departement of Economics ().