Voting in Assemblies of shareholders and Incomplete Markets

Mich Tvede and Hervé Crès ()
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Mich Tvede: Department of Economics [Copenhagen] - Faculty of Social Sciences [Copenhagen] - UCPH - University of Copenhagen = Københavns Universitet
Hervé Crès: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the ¯rst date and a ¯nite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting { one share, one vote { and at ½-majority stable equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most ½ £ 100 percent of the shareholders. It is shown that a ½-majority stable equilibrium exists provided that ½ ¸ min ½ S ¡ J S ¡ J + 1 ; B B + 1 ¾ where S is the number of states at the last date, J is the number of ¯rms and B is the dimensions of the sets of e±cient production plans for ¯rms. Moreover, an example shows that ½-majority stable equilibria need not exist for smaller ½'s.

Date: 2001
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