Lobbying under Pressure: The Effect of Salience on European Union Hedge Fund Regulation

Cornelia Woll ()
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Cornelia Woll: CEE - Centre d'études européennes et de politique comparée (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The virulent European Union hedge fund debate led many observers to suspect a paradigmatic battle between liberal market economies and countries in favour of tighter regulation. By contrast, this article points to the economic interests that drove government agendas. However, national preferences were not defined by the aggregate of a country's economic interests, but by very specific stakeholders only, despite the existence of opponents with considerable resources. This article argues that the unequal success of financial lobbyists depended on how their demands fitted into the government's overarching negotiation strategy. The primacy of government objectives, in turn, resulted from the high saliency of financial regulation and hedge funds in particular.

Keywords: Lobbying; Economic interests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-02186537
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Journal of Common Market Studies, 2013, 51 (3), pp.555-572. ⟨10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02314.x⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-02186537

DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2012.02314.x

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