Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements

Sergei Guriev and Mikhail Klimenko
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Mikhail Klimenko: Unknown

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Abstract: We use a dynamic incomplete contracting model to show that time structure of trade agreements is related to the characteristics of trade-facilitating investments. If these investments are specialised to trade in a particular homogeneous good, fixed-term agreements are more likely. Fixed-term agreements provide incentives for the initial investment but leave the parties the flexibility to revisit the need for future investment. If the agreement covers trade in multiple sectors or differentiated goods or services, inter-sectoral spillovers reduce risks of overinvestment. In this case, the parties are more likely to choose an evergreen agreement (with an advance termination notice).

Keywords: Trade agreements; Investiments; Trade policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12
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Published in The Economic Journal, 2015, 125 (589), pp.1818 - 1849. ⟨10.1111/ecoj.12258⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements (2015)
Working Paper: Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements (2015)
Working Paper: Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements (2010)
Working Paper: Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03392962

DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12258

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