Inefficient Short-Time Work

Pierre Cahuc and Sandra Nevoux
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Sandra Nevoux: Centre de recherche de la Banque de France - Banque de France

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Abstract: This paper shows that the reforms which expanded short-time work in France after the great 2008-2009 recession were largely to the benefit of large firms which are recurrent short-time work users. We argue that this expansion of short-time work is an inefficient way to provide insurance to workers, as it entails cross-subsidies which reduce aggregate production. An efficient policy should provide unemployment insurance benefits funded by experience rated employers' contributions instead of short-time work benefits. We find that short-time work entails significant production losses compared to an unemployment insurance scheme with experience rating.

Keywords: Short-time work; Unemployment insurance; Experience rating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-03-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03393097
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Related works:
Working Paper: Inefficient Short-Time Work (2019)
Working Paper: Inefficient Short-Time Work (2019)
Working Paper: Inefficient Short-Time Work (2018)
Working Paper: Inefficient Short-Time Work (2017)
Working Paper: Inefficient Short-Time Work (2017)
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