One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime

Quoc-Anh Do, Kieu-Trang Nguyen and Anh Tran
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Kieu-Trang Nguyen: LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science
Anh Tran: Indiana University - Indiana University [Bloomington] - Indiana University System

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Abstract: We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their patrilineal hometowns. Favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority. Promotions of officials strongly improve hometown infrastructure including roads, marketplaces, and irrigation. In contrast to democracies' pork-barrel politics, elected legislators are not influential. Favoritism is likely motivated by officials' social preferences for hometowns rather than by political considerations, because favors are narrowly targeted to small communes, and are stronger where local culture emphasizes the family bond.

Keywords: Favoritism; Patronage; Authoritarian Regime; Political Connection; Hometown; Infrastructure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-10-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2017)
Working Paper: One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime (2017)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2017)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2017)
Working Paper: One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime (2016)
Working Paper: One mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime (2016)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2013)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2013)
Working Paper: One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime (2013)
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