La réforme du Medef: chronique des difficultés de l'action collective patronale
Cornelia Woll ()
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Cornelia Woll: CERI - Centre de recherches internationales (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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Abstract:
Since its reform in 1998, the national association of French employers and industry, Medef, seems to be an example of strong interest organisation. Through a study of the collective action of businesses in France, this article sheds doubt on such an impression and argues that the business association has also been put severely under stress. Like all encompassing associations, Medef comprises a great variety of interests and constantly has to manage its internal heterogeneity. An analysis of the historical and institutional context of its recent reform demonstrates that Medefâ??s forceful media campaign should not be understood as a display of actual strength and coherence ; rather it is the last resort of collective action that the association can claim legitimately as their responsibility.
Keywords: France; Legitimacy; Organization; Collective Action; Reform; Employers; Légitimité; Organisation; Action collective; Réforme; Patronat (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Published in Revue Française de Science Politique, 2006, 56 (2), pp.255 - 279. ⟨10.3917/rfsp.562.0255⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03611932
DOI: 10.3917/rfsp.562.0255
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