EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

From a Multilateral Broker to the National Judge: The Law and Governance of Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 1980–2015

Jérôme Sgard ()
Additional contact information
Jérôme Sgard: CERI - Centre de recherches internationales (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL

Abstract: This chapter analyzes the succession of two sharply contrasted regimes for sovereign debt restructuring. The first one, which reached maturity during the 1980s, was marked by the central role of the IMF, with multilateral negotiations involving political settlements between debtor governments, creditor banks and their national governments. Today, however, this regime has been succeeded by the central role of national judges with jurisdiction over the main capital markets (especially New York) as the final interpreters of disputes over debt contracts. This chapter shows that the consequences are a "re-territorialization" of public debt restructuring, in spite of the globalization of markets; the domination of a discursive regime based on the language of private contract law; and a major strengthening of the rights of private investors, especially minority ones.

Keywords: sovereign debt; governance; law; IMF (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-10-27
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Nicolas Barreyre, Nicolas Delalande (eds). A World of Public Debts, Palgrave Macmillan, pp.427-452, 2020, Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance, 9783030487935. ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-48794-2_17⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03811975

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-48794-2_17

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Contact - Sciences Po Departement of Economics ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03811975