On Human Capital and Team Stability

Pierre-André Chiappori, Alfred Galichon () and Bernard Salanié
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Pierre-André Chiappori: Columbia University [New York]
Alfred Galichon: NYU - New York University [New York] - NYU - NYU System, ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In many economic contexts, agents from the same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called "roommate matching problems"), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We show that when each individual has a close substitute, a stable matching can be implemented with minimal policy intervention. Our results shed light on the stability of partnerships in the labor market. Moreover, they imply that the tools crafted in empirical studies of the marriage problem can easily be adapted to many roommate problems.

Date: 2019-06
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03898494
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Published in Journal of Human Capital, 2019, 13 (2), pp.236-259. ⟨10.1086/702925⟩

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Journal Article: On Human Capital and Team Stability (2019)
Working Paper: On Human Capital and Team Stability (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03898494

DOI: 10.1086/702925

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