Effective Communication in Cheap-Talk Games

Sidartha Gordon (), Navin Kartik, Melody Pei-Yu Lo, Wojciech Olszewski and Joel Sobel
Additional contact information
Sidartha Gordon: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL

Abstract: This paper presents arguments based on weak dominance and learning for selecting informative equilibria in a model of cheap-talk communication where players must use monotonic strategies. Under a standard regularity condition, only one equilibrium survives iterated deletion of dominated strategies. Under the same condition, we establish that best-response dynamics converges to this outcome.

Keywords: Communication; Learning; Equilibrium Selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-10-18
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04743271v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-04743271v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Effective Communication in Cheap-Talk Games (2024)
Working Paper: Effective communication in cheap talk games (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-04743271

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SciencePo Working papers Main from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Contact - Sciences Po Departement of Economics ().