Strategic Information Disclosure to Classification Algorithms: An Experiment

Jeanne Hagenbach () and Aurélien Salas ()
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Jeanne Hagenbach: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research, WZB - Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
Aurélien Salas: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We experimentally study how individuals strategically disclose multidimensional information to a Naive Bayes algorithm trained to guess their characteristics. Subjects' objective is to minimize the algorithm's accuracy in guessing a target characteristic.We vary what participants know about the algorithm's functioning and how obvious are the correlations between the target and other characteristics. Optimal disclosure strategies rely on subjects identifying whether the combination of their characteristics is common or not. Information about the algorithm functioning makes subjects identify correlations they otherwise do not see but also overthink. Overall, this information decreases the frequency of optimal disclosure strategies.

Keywords: Experiments; Strategic disclosure; Data management; Classification algorithms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-10-22
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-04823243v1
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