Quels remèdes pour les abus de position dominante ? Une analyse économique des décisions de la Commission européenne

Patrice Bougette () and Frédéric Marty
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Patrice Bougette: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur

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Abstract: Among other factors, one can assess the efficacy of a competition authority by its ability to choose and implement its remedies. Up until now, a dense economic literature has emerged on retrospective merger studies to measure the efficacy of merger control. Yet, little attention has been given to remedies in the other major pillar of competition policy, i.e. abuses of dominant position. In this paper, we try to fill the gap by first highlighting what is at stake and second analyse the most emblematic cases. We focus on the European Commission, while U.S. cases serve us as benchmark.

Keywords: Abus de position dominante; Remèdes; Pratiques unilatérales; Commission européenne (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00727517
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Published in Concurrences [Competition law journal / Revue des droits de la concurrence], 2012, 3, pp.30-45

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Working Paper: Quels remèdes pour les abus de position dominante ? Une analyse économique des décisions de la Commission européenne (2012)
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