Adaptive Behavioural Remedies and the Regulatory Turn in Antitrust Enforcement

Patrice Bougette () and Frédéric Marty ()
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Patrice Bougette: UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur
Frédéric Marty: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po, CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations [Montréal, Canada] = Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organizations [Montréal, Canada]

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Abstract: This article examines the expanding role of behavioural remedies in competition law enforcement and the institutional tensions this creates between antitrust and regulation. The difficulty arises when remedies are expected not only to bring unlawful conduct to an end, but also to restore competitive conditions, preserve contestability, or prevent market tipping over time. Building on a typology of remedy design, the article identifies a continuum ranging from one-off injunctions to positive obligations whose implementation extend over time and increasingly resemble regulatory intervention. In dynamic markets, rigid remedies may quickly become ineffective or counterproductive. Yet remedies that remain open to ongoing discretionary revision risk turning competition authorities into de facto regulators. The article therefore argues for a bounded form of adaptability: behavioural remedies should be revisable only within predefined substantive and procedural limits, linked to the original theory of harm. By distinguishing bounded adaptability from open-ended flexibility, the article clarifies the frontier between competition law enforcement and regulatory governance. In doing so, it contributes to current debates on the proper institutional scope of antitrust.

Keywords: Antitrust; behavioural remedies; Competition law; regulation; Dynamic markets; Digital economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06-03
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Published in ORDO Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 2026, ⟨10.1515/ordo-2026-3004⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:halshs-05645194

DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2026-3004

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