Three essays in political economy

Trois essais en économie politique

Charles Louis-Sidois ()
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Charles Louis-Sidois: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In the first chapter (« Optimal Vote Buying » coauthored with Leon Musolff, Princeton University), we analyze a vote buying problem. We show that bribing a supermajority can be cheaper due to pivotal considerations. When a large number of committee members receive a bribe, they do not expect to be pivotal in the election. As a result, it is sufficient to offer them a small amount of money in exchange for their vote. Due to this mechanism, it turns out that the vote buyer generally prefers to bribe a supermajority. In the second chapter (« Voting and contributing when the group is watching » coauthored with Emeric Henry, Sciences Po) we study the interaction between the way members vote on rules and their subsequent behaviors. This analysis applies to groups who choose their own rules and who care about their image. We study how players' considerations depend on the visibility of the process. We show that multiple norms can emerge. We discuss the problem of a social planner and the implications for welfare. The last chapter (« Military service and political participation » coauthored with Etienne Fize) investigates the impact of the French military service on political behaviors. Exploiting the suspension of mandatory conscription for French men, we find a significant and positive impact of military service on turnout. This effect ranges from 3.6 percentage points for the first round of the presidential election of 2012 to 8.9 percentage points for the second round of the legislative elections. We also investigate the impact of conscription on political preferences and we find that former conscripts are significantly more nationalist and conservative.

Keywords: Political economy; Applied microeconomics; Electoral behaviors; Social choice; Economie politique; Microéconomie appliquée; Comportements électoraux; Choix social (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://theses.hal.science/tel-03419395
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Published in Economics and Finance. Institut d'études politiques de paris - Sciences Po, 2018. English. ⟨NNT : 2018IEPP0019⟩

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