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Family, marriage markets and inequality: a matching approach

Famille, marché du mariage et inégalités: l'approche par les modèles d'appariement

Simon Weber
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Simon Weber: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This dissertation deals with couple formation on the marriage market, and adopts a perspective that focuses on inequality both at the between- and within-household levels. Chapter 1 deals with the role of marital preferences on growing income inequalities between households. Edoardo Ciscato and I use mating patterns in the United States from 1962 to 2015 to measure the impact of changes in marital preferences on between-household inequality. Using structural methods, we show that if mating patterns had not changed since 1971, the 2015 Gini coefficient between households would be lower by 6%. In chapter 2, I propose to bring together the literature on matching models and collective models. To do so, Alfred Galichon, Scott Kominers and myself construct a matching framework with imperfectly transferable utility. We show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and provide two algorithms to compute the equilibrium. We also provide guiding steps for estimation by maximum likelihood as well as an empirical illustration. Chapter 3 explores further the integration of collective models into the ITU matching framework. I develop the idea that the distribution of bargaining power is endogenous to the determination of an equilibrium on the marriage market. I characterize classes of collective models that can be embedded in the ITU setting. I provide computational techniques to estimate these models. I provide a full application of my results using collective model that features private consumption, leisure and a public good produced from time inputs.

Keywords: Marriage; Matching; Collective models; Inequality; Mariage; Appariement; Modèles Collectifs; Inégalités (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09-14
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://theses.hal.science/tel-03436364
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Published in Economics and Finance. Institut d'études politiques de paris - Sciences Po, 2017. English. ⟨NNT : 2017IEPP0039⟩

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