The visible hand: labor market institutions, and housing taxation
La main visible: institutions du marché du travail, et taxation du logement
Jamil Nur
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Jamil Nur: ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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Abstract:
In this thesis, I analyze the role of institutions in two markets: labor and housing. In chapter 1 (joint with Elisa Guglielminetti), I use a random search model to study the sorting of new hires into open-ended and fixed-term contracts. The co-existence of these two types of contracts is explained by match heterogeneity. When permanent contracts are expected to last longer, firms offer temporary contracts to low-productivity matches and permanent contracts to highly productive ones. Match productivity is interpreted as the fit of worker's skills to task requirements. This hypothesis is supported by matched employer-employee data from a large Italian region. I further perform a policy analysis, showing that reforms liberalizing fixed-term contracts encourage their use, have non-linear effects on aggregate employment, but reduce long-term unemployment. In chapter 2, I investigate the effect of a liberalization of fixed-term contracts, finding a negative effect on new open-ended hires. This result validates the simulations in the first chapter, and confirms the role of match quality as sorting mechanism between contracts of different lengths and protection levels. Chapter 3 (joint with Robert Gary-Bobo), studies the distribution of housing in an overlapping generation model. Finding its equilibrium inefficient, I devise a system of proportional taxes to restore optimality.
Keywords: Institutions; Labor market; Contracts; Housing taxation; Marché du travail; Contrats; Taxation du logement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-09-09
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Published in Economics and Finance. Institut d'études politiques de Paris - Sciences Po, 2016. English. ⟨NNT : 2016IEPP0033⟩
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:spmain:tel-03650786
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