Strategic Approval Voting in a large electorate

Jean-François Laslier

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: The paper considers approval voting for a large population of voters. It is proven that, based on statistical information about candidate scores, rational voters vote sincerly. It is also proven that if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidate is elected.

Keywords: Approval voting; Strategic Voting; Probabilistic Voting; Vote par assentiment; Vote stratégique; vote probabiliste; Elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00242909
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic approval voting in a large electorate (2006)
Working Paper: Strategic approval voting in a large electorate (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242909

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