Strategic approval voting in a large electorate

Jean-François Laslier

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: The paper considers approval voting for a large population of voters.It is proven that, based on statistical information about candidatescores, rational voters vote sincerly and according to a simple behavioralrule. It is also proven that if a Condorcet-winner exists, this candidateis elected.

Keywords: Strategic Voting. Sincere voting. Approval voting. Condorcet.; Strategic Voting. Sincere voting. Approval voting. Condorcet (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12-21
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00121751
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Approval Voting in a large electorate (2004)
Working Paper: Strategic approval voting in a large electorate (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00121751

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