Epistemically stable strategy sets

Geir Asheim, Mark Voorneveld and Jörgen Weibull

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Abstract: This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.

Keywords: Epistemic game theory; epistemic stability; rationalizability; closedness under rational behavior; mutual p-belief.; mutual p-belief (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-12-09
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00440098v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Epistemically Stable Strategy Sets (2009)
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