Epistemically Stable Strategy Sets

Geir Asheim, Mark Voorneveld and Jörgen Weibull

No 01/2010, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles,and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.

Keywords: Epistemic game theory; epistemic stability; rationalizability; closedness under rational behavior; mutual p-belief (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2009-12-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Epistemically stable strategy sets (2009)
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