Majority Judgment vs Majority Rule

Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki ()
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Rida Laraki: Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres, LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

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Abstract: The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on measures—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparisons—lead to another method that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of "polarized" candidates. The method—majority judgment—meets R. A. Dahl's requirement that an apathetic majority does not always defeat an intense minority. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation.

Keywords: measuring; ranking; electing; majority rule; Condorcet consistency; tyranny of majority; intensity problem; majority-gauge; strategy-proofness; polarization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01304043v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Majority judgment vs. majority rule (2020)
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